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Abstract 
 
Within the framework of their long-term working memory theory, Ericsson 
and Kintsch (1995) propose that experts rapidly store information in long-term 
memory through two mechanisms: elaboration of long-term memory patterns 
and schemas and use of retrieval structures.  They use chess players’ memory 
as one of their most compelling sources of empirical evidence.  In this paper, I 
show that evidence from chess memory, far from supporting their theory, 
limits its generality.  Evidence from other domains reviewed by Ericsson and 
Kintsch, such as medical expertise, is not as strong as claimed, and sometimes 
contradicts the theory outright.  I argue that Ericsson and Kintsch’s concept of 
retrieval structure conflates three different types of memory structures that 
possess quite different properties.  One of these types of structures—generic, 
general-purpose retrieval structures—has a narrower use than proposed by 
Ericsson and Kintsch: it applies only in domains where there is a conscious, 
deliberate intent by individuals to improve their memory.  Other mechanisms, 
including specific retrieval structures, exist that permit a rapid encoding into 
long-term memory under other circumstances. 
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Some Shortcomings of Long-Term Working Memory 
 
Ever since the seminal work of De Groot (1946/1978) on chess expertise, 
psychologists have attempted to understand the mental mechanisms and 
structures that allow some people to excel in domains that seem to overtax 
humans’ limited cognitive system.  One of the most successful attempts has 
been Chase and Simon’s (1973) chunking theory, which accounts both for 
data from classical laboratory experiments and for empirical evidence on 
expert behaviour.  Recently, and partly as a result of the perceived limitations 
of the chunking theory, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) have proposed a new 
comprehensive theory—the long-term working memory (LT-WM) theory.  It 
is the goal of this paper to discuss and evaluate the explanatory power of LT-
WM in general, and of the construct of retrieval structure, one of its key 
ingredients, in particular. 
The Chunking Theory and the Skilled Memory Theory  
De Groot (1946/1978) was mostly interested in the way chessplayers organise 
their thoughts when trying to decide which move to play next.  Somewhat to 
his surprise, his analysis of verbal protocols did not detect differences in the 
macro-structure of thought (e.g., depth of search, number of nodes searched, 
etc.), except that better players obviously found better moves than weaker 
players.  The rapidity with which his best players were able to home in on 
important aspects of a position led De Groot to the hypothesis that the key to 
expertise lies in a vast knowledge base, made accessible by highly tuned 
perceptual mechanisms.  To test his hypothesis, he presented chess positions 
for a short amount of time (from two to fifteen seconds), and, as predicted, 
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found a huge difference in recall performance between masters and weaker 
players. 
 De Groot’s theoretical explanation was rather vague, however, and one 
had to wait until 1973 to have a precise, information-processing model, with 
Chase and Simon’s chunking theory, based on the EPAM theory (Elementary 
Perceiver and Memoriser; Feigenbaum & Simon, 1962, 1984).  Chase and 
Simon (1973), proposed that chessplayers, as well as other experts, acquire a 
large number of chunks (familiar units denoting perceptual patterns) through 
practice and study.  Chunks are accessed by sorting stimuli through a 
discrimination net, where various perceptual features are tested (see 
Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984, for details), and act as the conditions of 
productions (Newell & Simon, 1972).  In the case of chess, chunks evoke 
information such as plausible moves, potential plans, or evaluations of 
portions of the chess position at hand.  In addition, according to Chase and 
Simon, general cognitive parameters, such as the time to learn a chunk or the 
number of chunks that can be held in short-term memory (STM), do not differ 
between experts and non-experts, and place stringent limits on what 
operations can be carried out.  For example, the chunking theory proposes that 
it takes about eight seconds to learn a new chunk, and that only about seven 
chunks can be held in STM.  Chess masters can thus recall a briefly presented 
position almost perfectly because they can recognise more and larger chunks 
than weaker players, and they can find better moves because chunks give rapid 
access to key information that may be elaborated by further look-ahead.  
Mutatis mutandis, Chase and Simon’s theory can be, and has been, applied to 
other domains of expertise. 
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 This simple model has generated a wealth of empirical studies, which 
have confirmed most of its predictions, but have also uncovered two main 
weaknesses.  First, information seems to be transferred into long-term memory 
(LTM) faster than proposed by the chunking theory.  For example, Charness 
(1976) has found that interpolating a task between the presentation of a 
position and its recall affects performance only slightly.  Second, it is hard to 
see how such a small memory capacity allows experts to carry out complex 
tasks, such as search through the problem space.  This point is made very 
strongly in Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) and is buttressed by the fact that 
current production systems such as ACT (Adaptive Control of Thought; 
Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Lebière, 1998) and Soar (State, Operator, And 
Result; Newell, 1990) require a working memory much larger than a half 
dozen chunks. 
 An important alternative to the chunking theory was proposed by 
Chase, Ericsson and Staszewski (Chase & Ericsson, 1982; Ericsson & 
Staszewski, 1989; Staszewski, 1990), who supported their theory by detailed 
studies of mnemonists and experts in mental calculation.  Their skilled 
memory theory explains experts’ remarkable memory and problem-solving 
abilities through three principles: (a) Information is encoded with numerous 
and elaborated cues related to prior knowledge; (b) Experts develop a retrieval 
structure, that is a LTM structure for indexing material in LTM.  As a classical 
example of a retrieval structure, take the method of loci, in which one uses a 
general, predetermined set of locations.  During presentation of the material to 
memorise, associations are made between the locations and the items to learn.  
At recall, the locations are used as retrieval cues to access the items to be 
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recalled; and (c) Time required by encoding and retrieval operations decreases 
with practice.       
 Chase and Ericsson (1982) note that it takes extensive practice to 
develop and use a retrieval structure.  Typically, under rapid presentation, the 
structure can be used to successfully encode only one type of material, say 
digits, without transfer to other material.  Finally, the retrieval structure must 
be activated before the material is presented.   
The Long-Term Working Memory Approach 
Recently, the skilled memory theory has been extended into the long-term 
working memory (LT-WM) theory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995).  Using data 
from tasks such as memory for menu orders, the digit-span task, mental 
multiplication, mental abacus calculation, chess, medical expertise, and text 
comprehension, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) present compelling empirical 
evidence that experts in various domains are able to encode information into 
LTM faster than was proposed by traditional models of human memory, 
including the chunking theory.  The core of their long-term working memory 
theory is that “cognitive processes are viewed as a sequence of stable states 
representing end products of processing” and that “acquired memory skills 
allow these end products to be stored in long-term memory and kept directly 
accessible by means of retrieval cues in short-term memory [...]” (Ericsson & 
Kintsch, 1995, p.  211).  Encoding occurs through a retrieval structure and/or 
through knowledge-based associations connecting items to other items or to 
LTM patterns and schemas, which allows for an integrated representation of 
the information in LTM.  The task demands on memory dictate which 
encoding method will be used.  
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 A key element in the LT-WM theory, which distinguishes it from most 
other theories of memory, is that experts develop, through practice and study, 
retrieval structures for the task domain.  Retrieval structures are “a set of 
retrieval cues [that] are organized in a stable structure” (Ericsson & Kintsch, 
1995, p.  216).  The best empirical evidence for these structures is offered by 
the detailed study of SF and DD, two experts in the digit-span task (Chase & 
Ericsson, 1982; Staszewski, 1990).  It is proposed that SF and DD store 
groups of digits and additional semantic information in a hierarchical retrieval 
structure.  Analysis of reaction times and of verbal protocols, as well as 
experimental manipulations, provides strong support for the presence of 
retrieval structures within these tasks.  As stated by the theory, in addition to 
retrieval structures, LTM elaborations of previously stored semantic memory 
facilitate the encoding of information by adding redundant cues, and the 
relative roles played by the retrieval structure and LTM learning vary from 
task to task. 
 The main thrust of Ericsson and Kintsch’s paper is to propose that the 
basic tenets of the skilled memory theory (Chase & Ericsson, 1982), including 
the presence of retrieval structures, are generalizable across a wide variety of 
tasks.  Thus, the LT-WM theory goes beyond the more limited claim that the 
concept of retrieval structures is useful only in tasks where subjects show a 
deliberate and conscious attempt to improve their memory through strategies 
(“mnemonics”) and where the scheme for subjective organisation of the 
material to be recalled is known to subjects beforehand.  As a consequence, 
the LT-WM theory conflicts with traditional accounts of working memory, 
which stress its transitory storage capacity.  If correct, the LT-WM theory 
would be a major step in our understanding of human cognition.  It puts 
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together, in a unified framework, empirical results from domains that are 
normally treated separately: classical experimental studies on memory, as well 
as research on expertise, text comprehension, and problem solving.   
 In this paper, I will show that this claim of generality is exaggerated.  
Although there is no doubt that most experts have rapid (although less 
impressive than SF or DD’s) access to LTM, the concept of retrieval structure, 
which plays a key role in the LT-WM theory, suffers from a number of 
weaknesses: the concept is not sufficiently well specified to allow precise 
predictions to be made (this also applies to the LT-WM theory in general);  it 
is used inconsistently; and it has received weaker empirical support than 
claimed by Ericsson and Kintsch. 
 I will start by considering the lack of specificity of LT-WM and 
discussing some inconsistencies in the way Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) use 
the concept of retrieval structure.  I will then analyse in detail the application 
of LT-WM to the domain of chess expertise, a model task in the study of 
expertise (Charness, 1992), which has the advantages of a long scientific 
tradition going back to Binet (1893/1966), and of offering a large amount of 
empirical data.  Since Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) note that “research on 
planning and memory of chess positions offers some of the most compelling 
evidence for LT-WM” (p.  238), the choice of this domain is adequate to test 
their theoretical claims of generality.  Then, I will briefly discuss the 
application of LT-WM to some of the other domains of expertise reviewed by 
Ericsson and Kintsch.  Finally, I will compare the LT-WM account with two 
recent computational theories of expertise, one devoted to the digit-span task 
(EPAM-IV; Richman, Staszewski & Simon, 1995) and the other to chess 
expertise (template theory; Gobet & Simon, 1996b; 1998; in press), in order to 
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highlight the similarities and the differences in the way these theories use the 
concept of retrieval structure.   
Lack of Specificity of the Theory and Inconsistency in Using the Concept 
of Retrieval Structure  
One serious difficulty with understanding, applying, and evaluating LT-WM is 
that Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) provide no definition of the concepts of 
patterns and schemas, which are key elements of their theory and which both 
have a large variety of meanings in cognitive psychology.  As a consequence, 
the reader has to use his or her own definition of patterns and schemas, which 
may or may not correspond to Ericsson and Kintsch’s.  Another difficulty is 
that the theoretical properties that they assign to the concept of retrieval 
structure are not consistent across domains.  For example, there are important 
differences in Ericsson and Kintsch’s use of retrieval structure in their 
treatment of text comprehension as compared with their use of that concept in 
other domains.  Recall that Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p. 220) propose that 
LT-WM includes two types of retrieval mechanisms: “cue-based retrieval 
without additional encodings,” which refers to retrieval structures, and “cue-
based retrieval with an elaborated structure associating items from a given trial 
or context,” which refers to knowledge-based associations.  Recall also that 
Ericsson and Kintsch (p. 216) define a retrieval structure as a set of retrieval 
cues organised in a stable structure.  Their nomenclature changes when 
dealing with text comprehension, where they refer to two different sources of 
retrieval structures: domain knowledge and episodic text structure (pp. 230-
231).  Inconsistencies are apparent when the previous definition of retrieval 
structures is compared with the episodic text structure, which is generated case 
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by case, based on several levels of discourse (surface features, propositions, 
macropropositions, semantic relations, rhetorical relations; Ericsson & 
Kintsch, 1995, p.  230).  This structure does not meet the criterion of stability 
mentioned earlier, as it becomes harder to use as subsequent sentences are 
processed.  In addition, this structure is rapidly  created (in a matter of 
seconds) as a sentence is processed, while it takes several months to develop 
the retrieval structures described in domains of expertise such as the digit-span 
task.  I will come back to the difficulties associated with the lack of specificity 
of LT-WM in the next section, after describing the LT-WM account of chess 
expertise. 
LT-WM Account of Chess Expertise 
Building on previous research mentioned in Ericsson and Staszewski (1989), 
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) propose that skilled chess players use a 
hierarchical retrieval structure corresponding to the 64 squares of the chess 
board.  Thanks to this structure, which both relates pieces to each other and 
associates individual pieces to their respective locations, a position is 
represented as an integrated hierarchical structure, which allows a rapid 
encoding into LTM.  LTM itself stores, among other things, patterns and 
schemas, into which new information can be encoded rapidly, independently 
of the use of the retrieval structure.  It is proposed that the retrieval structure 
offers an explanation of how chess masters can plan and evaluate alternative 
sequences of moves. 
 With the explicit goal of supporting the hypothesis that chess masters 
use a retrieval structure, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, pp.  237-238) review 
several pieces of evidence: results from recall experiments where the random 
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chess positions lack meaningful configurations; results showing that skilled 
chess players can rapidly access the location of pieces within a memorised 
chess position; and results showing that masters can mentally manipulate and 
update the contents of a position when playing blindfold chess.  In addition, 
Ericsson and Kintsch  (1995, p. 214-215 and 237-238) discuss a few other 
chess experiments. Of these, I will focus on: interference due to concurrent 
memory tasks, role of piece grouping during presentation, and recall of 
multiple boards. 
Vagueness of LT-WM Account for Chess Expertise 
Although chess is presented as providing some of the strongest support for  
LT-WM, the theory is stated in rather general terms and leaves many crucial 
parameters and necessary mechanisms unspecified: What is the hierarchical 
organisation of the retrieval structure? What type of information (pieces, 
chunks, or higher-level schemas) can be encoded at the various levels of the 
hierarchy? How long does it take to encode a retrieval cue? Are cues subject 
to some decay?1 Are cues for all the “end products of processing” encoded in 
the retrieval structure, or is the encoding probabilistic? Is encoding under 
strategic control? And, for that matter, what counts as “end products of 
processing” within the chess domain? While it is true that Ericsson and 
Kintsch’s goal was not to offer a detailed theory of chess expertise but to 
show how LT-WM could account for data from a large variety of domains, it 
is also true that without the kind of specifications just mentioned, it is simply 
impossible to evaluate the  LT-WM explanation of chess expertise—or for 
other domains.   
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 In addition, most of the experiments reported in their paper use rather 
long presentation times (typically, 2 s per move or 2 s per piece), and Ericsson 
and Kintsch are not explicit about what mechanisms are used with 
experiments showing recall with short presentation times, say, less than 10 s 
for the entire position (typically 25 pieces), such as the standard De Groot 
(1946/1978) recall task.  It is clear from a previous publication (Ericsson & 
Staszewski, 1989) that the retrieval structure is also assumed to be used 
efficiently with short presentation times, but the reader is left in the dark as to 
what really happens in this case.  This is a weak point of the theory, as most 
evidence in chess research has been gathered with such short presentation 
times. 
 It has been known since De Groot (1946/1978) that strong players can 
recall a game position almost perfectly with a presentation time of 5 s and still 
get high percentages of recall with presentation times as low as 2 s (for 
additional data on very short presentation times, see Gobet & Simon, in 
press).  How does LT-WM account for these results? A first interpretation is 
that pieces are encoded into the squares of the retrieval structure.  This 
interpretation rapidly runs into several problems, however.  Two examples 
will suffice.  First, the encoding times per unit of information (piece) must be 
very short, much shorter than in the other tasks reviewed by Ericsson and 
Kintsch (1995).  With all other domains of expertise discussed by Ericsson 
and Kintsch, the presentation time per unit of information (e.g., one digit or 
one menu item) is at least 1 s, and experts therefore have at least 1 s to encode 
each unit.  In chess, where masters can recall almost perfectly a position 
containing 25 pieces with a presentation time of 5 s, we have to assume that 
individual units of information (the chess pieces) are encoded into the 
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retrieval structure very fast, in the order of about 200 ms (5 s divided by 25).2 
Second, recall of random positions is below what would be predicted by this 
interpretation of the theory: even if masters maintain a modest superiority over 
weaker players with presentation times up to 10 s (Gobet & Simon, 1996a), 
their performance is poor (on average, 5.5 pieces out of 25), and is not above 
what would be predicted if masters were only storing information in STM, as 
shown in the computer simulations discussed in Gobet (1998b). 
 A more plausible interpretation is that, rather than encoding pieces into 
squares,  experts encode schemas and patterns into higher levels of the 
hierarchical retrieval structure.  Given such a mechanism, the LT-WM theory 
is consistent with masters’ performance with rapid presentation times (for 
example, random positions are harder than game positions because it is less 
likely that patterns or schemas are retrieved).  With this interpretation, 
however, all the explanatory power of the theory rests on patterns and 
schemas, and the concept of retrieval structure is not necessary, a traditional 
limited-size STM being sufficient (cf.  Gobet & Simon, 1996b).  Finally, 
encoding cues for patterns and schemas into the retrieval structure raises one 
important question, which Ericsson and Kintsch do not address: By what 
mechanism is information contained in these LTM entities “unpacked” at 
lower levels of the retrieval structure, allowing masters to rapidly access the 
location of each piece?  
Empirical Data from Chess Research Taken as Support for the  LT-WM 
Theory 
I now review the empirical evidence from chess memory research given by 
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) as supporting their position.  As I will show, this 
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evidence, far from supporting LT-WM, raises serious difficulties for the 
concept of retrieval structure, and, as a consequence, for the LT-WM theory in 
general.   
Random Positions with Long Presentation Time 
Random material is crucial in evaluating the hypothesis of retrieval structures, 
for, with experiments using meaningful material, it is difficult to tease apart 
the role of such structures and that of patterns and schemas.  According to 
Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p.  237), “skilled chess players are able to encode 
and store the locations of individual chess pieces of a chess position in the 
absence of meaningful configurations of chess pieces.” This comment is 
surprising, because empirical evidence about random positions is devastating 
for the LT-WM theory: with short (see above) and long presentation times, 
players of all skill levels have huge difficulties with this type of position. 
 With visual presentation of the whole board for 60 s, masters do not 
recall more than 70% of the pieces correctly (Gobet & Simon, in press).  With 
an auditory, piece-by-piece average presentation of about 50 s, at a rate of one 
piece every 2 s, masters do not recall more than around 60% (Saariluoma 
1989).  In addition, Saariluoma (1989), again using dictation of pieces, has 
shown that masters recall little from four random positions presented in 
sequence (around 10% per position), while they perform relatively well with 
game positions (around 60% correct per position).  Interestingly,  masters’ 
recall performance with random positions is roughly what is predicted by one 
of the traditional theories dismissed by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995)—the 
Chase and Simon (1973) chunking theory, which imposes rather strong limits 
on memory capacity and on learning rate.3 
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 I will focus in my analysis on the auditory presentation, as the results 
with visual presentation were not available to Ericsson and Kintsch.  In their 
instantiation of the LT-WM theory for experiments where positions are 
dictated, Ericsson and Kintsch state that  
“If, on the other hand, chess experts had a retrieval structure 
corresponding to a mental chess board, they could store each piece at a 
time at the appropriate location within the retrieval structure.  After the 
end of the presentation the experts would be able to perfectly recall the 
entire position if the presentation rate had been slow enough.” (1995, 
p.  237, italics added).   
 In addition, Ericsson and Kintsch mention that, with game but not with 
random positions, meaningful patterns of relations between pieces can be 
encoded, allowing the position to be stored as more integrated structures.  
This ability to find higher-order relations in game positions explains why such 
positions are easier to recall than random positions. 
 This explanation, while accounting for the superiority in the recall of 
game positions over random positions, is unsatisfactory, however, when one 
keeps in mind that Ericsson and Kintsch reviewed Saariluoma’s (1989) 
experiments to show that “the ability to store random chess positions provides 
particularly strong evidence for the ability to encode individual chess pieces 
into the retrieval structure” (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995, p. 237; italics added) 
and that recall for random positions is far from perfect even with masters (not 
more than about 60%, that is about 15 pieces, after a 50-second presentation).  
To begin with, the retrieval structure allows the encoding of individual pieces 
and, therefore, should be useful even for recalling random positions.  
Furthermore, there are at least as many relations of attack, defence, colour, 
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and proximity in random positions as in game positions (Chase & Simon, 
1973), which should allow experts to encode redundant cues, such as relations 
between pieces,4 into the hierarchical retrieval structure, in particular with 
presentation times of 50 s for the entire position.  In addition, the other 
mechanism provided by LT-WM—the ability to rapidly generate new 
associations of LTM patterns and schemas—should be able to operate with 
random positions as well, the term “pattern” being sufficiently vague to 
include small chunks of pieces such as found in random positions.  Note, 
finally, that the retrieval structure used with SF and DD in the digit-span task 
allows them to remember sequences of digits that are essentially random.  
That SF and DD are able to reliably and rapidly recode random items into 
meaningful chunks, while chess masters are not, seems to point to a key 
difference between the cognitive processes and the task environment of the 
digit-span and chess experts.  Ericsson and Kintsch suggest that masters’ 
relatively low performance with random chess positions is accounted for by 
the difficulty of encoding them into “new distinct structures” in LTM.5 This 
explanation undermines their claim that recall of random positions strongly 
supports the hypothesis of a retrieval structure, as it rests on the absence of 
schemas, and not on positive properties of the retrieval structure. 
  The LT-WM theory actually seems to be caught in a dilemma.  On the 
one hand, it proposes a powerful retrieval structure and the capacity to rapidly 
make new associations into LTM.  On the other hand, data with random 
positions show that chess experts have a harder time remembering random 
positions than would be predicted by the theory.  Ericsson and Kintsch’s 
solution to this dilemma is to propose that information can be encoded as 
patterns and schemas into the retrieval structure with game positions, but not 
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with random positions.  This solution does explain the superiority of recall 
with game positions over that with random positions, but does not explain 
why, in spite of the powerful mechanisms and structures associated with LT-
WM, masters do not recall random positions better.  Nor does this solution 
provide any evidence that the recall of random positions supports the 
hypothesis of a chess retrieval structure, although this was the explicit goal of 
reviewing data on the recall of dictated random positions. 
Mental Manipulation and Updating of the Board 
Citing unpublished experiments by Ericsson and Oliver (1984; see Ericsson 
and Staszewski, 1989, for a summary), Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) propose 
that the retrieval structure hypothesis accounts for the ability of a master to 
rapidly access the information of individual squares of the chessboard.  With 
the qualification, already mentioned above, that they do not specify 
mechanisms describing how information can be transferred from the high 
levels of the retrieval structure to the square level, their argumentation appears 
sound.  They also refer to experiments by Saariluoma (1991) using blindfold 
chess, and propose that the retrieval structure hypothesis offers an explanation 
for chess masters’ ability to play without external perceptual support at a level 
close to their normal skill.  This part of their argument requires several 
comments. 
 To begin with, one should mention that no formal study has 
established to what extent masters can play blindfold chess at a level close to 
that in normal chess.  Holding (1985) actually suggested that the quality of 
play in the two situations differs radically, blindfold games being 
characterised by many more blunders than normal games.  However, anecdotal 
evidence also shows that some blindfold games can be of rather good quality.  
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We therefore need to look at laboratory studies to test Ericsson and Kintsch’s 
(1995) claims about masters’ ability to represent a position during a blindfold 
game by using a retrieval structure.   
 Saariluoma (1991) has carried out an experiment which directly bears 
on this question and clearly illustrates the difficulty of playing blindfold chess.  
He dictated a game at a rate of one half-move (move for White or Black) 
every 2 s, and asked players to indicate the location of the pieces after 30 half-
moves.  He found that masters could recall more than 90% of the position 
when the moves were taken from an actual game or when the moves were 
random, but legal.  However, when the game consisted of (possibly) illegal 
moves, the recall dropped to only around 20%, which was barely better than 
weak players’ recall.  Using the chunking theory (Chase & Simon, 1973) as a 
framework, Saariluoma’s (1991) explanation was that random legal games 
drift only slowly into chaotic positions where few chunks can be recognised, 
while random illegal games move more rapidly into such positions.  It is 
unclear what explanation the LT-WM theory offers for the differential recall 
of random legal and random illegal games, because in both cases, playing a 
move produces changes on the board that can be equally well encoded into the 
retrieval structure or into LTM elaborations.  It is also unclear how the LT-
WM theory could incorporate Saariluoma’s explanation based on chunking 
without drastically reducing the role played by the retrieval structure in chess 
players’ memory.  As was the case with the recall of random positions with 
long presentation time,  Saariluoma’s (1991) experiment  fails to provide 
positive evidence for the retrieval structure that is not confounded by the 
presence of patterns and schemas. 
Interference Due to a Concurrent Memory Task 
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Saariluoma (1992) has shown that, in a move generation task, a (concurrent) 
articulatory suppression task did not impair performance, but that a visuo-
spatial task did.  Saariluoma (1991) found the same pattern of results in a task 
where subjects had to mentally construct the correct positions from the moves 
dictated by an experimenter (see Robbins et al., 1996, for similar results).  
Finally, he found that interfering tasks (both visuo-spatial and articulatory) 
had no effect when they were carried out after a sequence of moves had been 
dictated.  While these results are compatible with the LT-WM theory, it is 
unclear why they should “clearly implicate LT-WM in the maintained access 
to the updated chess positions” (Ericsson & Kintsch, p.  238).  The dictation 
time per move was long enough in these experiments (at least 2 s per move) to 
allow relatively slow encoding into LTM (many sequences of moves in master 
games are standard, and thus may be coded as chunks), and traditional models 
of chess memory, most of which stress the visual code used by chess players 
(e.g.  Chase & Simon 1973), would predict the same result.  Finally, the result 
that a concurrent task impairs learning more than a posterior task is consistent 
with all current theories of memory. 
Piece Grouping during Presentation 
In their summary of expert memory in domains other than text 
comprehension, Ericsson and Kintsch (p.  238) note that  
“The strongest evidence for retrieval structures concerns the ability of 
experts to independently store pieces of information when they are 
presented out of their normal context in scrambled order.  After such a 
presentation, experts in medicine and chess and a waiter (JC) were able 
to recall all of the information in an order reflecting its typical 
meaningful organization in the retrieval structure.” 
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 However, experimental results—some of them reviewed in their 
paper—tell another story.  Charness (1976), as well as Frey and Adesman 
(1976), has shown that pieces presented at a rate of about 2 s per piece are 
better retained when they are presented by chunks similar to the ones 
identified by Chase and Simon (1973a) than when they are presented by 
columns or randomly; this result is valid for both verbal and visual 
presentation.  Saariluoma (1989) found a similar result between an ordered 
reading (White pieces are dictated first, starting from Pawns, and then from 
King to Knight in decreasing chess value) and a random-order reading.  
According to the LT-WM framework, the presence of a powerful retrieval 
structure should allow experts to independently store units of information 
regardless of the type of grouping (by chunks, by columns, or in scrambled 
order) during presentation.  The results reported above show that chess experts 
do not have this ability and, therefore, directly contradict one important 
prediction of the LT-WM theory. (As discussed below, this prediction is also 
incorrect with medical expertise.) 
Recall of Multiple Boards  
As predicted by the LT-WM theory, interfering material presented after the 
presentation of a position affects recall only minimally (Charness, 1976; Frey 
and Adesman, 1976).  In the same line of research, Cooke, Atlas, Lane, and 
Berger (1993) show that players can recall several boards presented briefly (5 
or 8 s each).  Ericsson and Kintsch take these data as evidence for rapid 
encoding into LT-WM.  However, Cooke et al. (1993), as well as Gobet and 
Simon (1996b), show that the percentage of correct pieces per board decreases 
as a function of the number of boards attempted.  In addition, Gobet and 
Simon (1996b) show that subjects have difficulties with four and five boards.  
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These limits with large numbers of boards are real and seem difficult to 
overcome even with practice.  For example, Gobet and Simon (1996b) 
describe the development of a master trying to increase his performance in the 
multiple board experiment by using a mnemonic technique to help him 
distinguish and store the boards.  In the course of his 150-session practice, the 
master attempted to recall as many as 10 boards a few times but showed a 
plateau at around 8 boards.  How does the LT-WM theory account for these 
results? Since Ericsson and Staszewski (1989) propose that a single retrieval 
structure is used by chess players, this concept cannot be used to explain the 
recall of multiple boards (except for the last board presented).  Then, the 
performance is made possible through the other mechanism provided by LT-
WM—LTM elaborations.  But can this mechanism explain the drop in 
performance with four and five boards? Again, the LT-WM theory is not 
specific enough to answer this question.   
 
LT-WM Theory and Chess: Summary of Evidence 
In summary, the evidence adduced in favour of the application of the LT-WM 
theory to chess is much weaker than proposed by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995).  
On the one hand, the proposed hierarchical retrieval structure receives little 
empirical support.  Contrary to the predictions of the theory, random positions 
with long presentation time are not better recalled than proposed by the 
chunking theory, manipulation of random boards is very difficult when the 
moves are illegal, and presentation of pieces in a scrambled order impairs 
recall.  On the other hand, encoding through LTM elaborations seems slower 
than proposed by the theory, as evidenced by the multiple board recall task, 
where there is a drop in performance with four and five boards.  Results with 
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concurrent and posterior interference tasks are compatible with the theory, as 
with most other theories.  Thus, the strongest support for the LT-WM theory is 
offered by the ability of chess masters to rapidly access the information of 
individual squares and in their ability to overcome the effect of posterior 
interfering tasks. 
Retrieval Structures in Other Domains of Expert Memory 
As mentioned above, the evidence for retrieval structures is convincing for 
domains such as the digit span task and memory for menu orders, where there 
is a conscious intent to improve one’s memory through strategies.  Results 
from mental calculation and abacus calculation are compatible with the 
presence of a retrieval structure, but are also compatible with other theoretical 
explanations, such as the use of the visuo-spatial sketchpad (Baddeley, 1990; 
Hatano & Osawa, 1983) or the automatisation of procedures (Anderson, 
1983). Contrary to the claims of Kintsch and Ericsson, I do not believe that 
medical expertise offers any support for retrieval structures.  In several 
studies, an inverse U-shaped relation has been found between expertise and 
recall performance, intermediate-level subjects obtaining better results than 
experts (e.g., Schmidt & Boshuizen, 1993).  Several explanations can be 
offered to account for this “anomaly”: experts spend less time studying the 
material because they reach a conclusion faster; experts are used to having the 
information available (cf.  Patel, Kaufman & Magder, 1996), and may develop 
the habit of not overloading their memory; or experts are more selective and 
focus on abstract information (the explanation favoured by Ericsson and 
Kintsch).6  However, it still seems fair to say that the available empirical 
evidence does not offer any special corroboration for the LT-WM theory.  
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Indeed, it actually seems to refute two of its predictions.  First, Ericsson and 
Kintsch  (1995, p. 238) take as strong evidence for retrieval structures the fact 
that experts in medicine can recall pieces of information even if they are 
presented in a scrambled order.  However, Vicente and Wang (1998) have 
argued that an experiment carried out by Coughlin and Patel (1987) 
contradicts this specific prediction (as noted above, this prediction is also 
incorrect with chess experts).  In this experiment, dictating symptoms in a 
scrambled order negatively affected medical experts’ recall performance when 
the temporal order of appearance of these symptoms was relevant for a correct 
diagnosis.  Second, Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p.  236-237) note that “it is 
reasonable to assume that a critical function of LT-WM in medical experts is 
not only to attain the correct diagnosis but to provide working memory 
support for reasoning about and evaluation of diagnostic alternatives.” If this 
is true, medical experts should recall not only abstract information about a 
case, but also concrete details, as these may play an important role in 
discriminating between alternatives.  They should therefore show better recall 
than intermediate-level subjects, which is not the case.  I will argue below that 
experts do not possess the storage capacities proposed by the LT-WM theory 
(both retrieval structure and rapid elaboration of LTM schemas) and may 
encode information only after they have evoked a particular schema through 
pattern recognition.   
 In summary, the evidence for retrieval structures is good for the digit-
span task and for memory for menu orders, is reasonable with mental 
calculation and mental abacus calculation, but it is weak for medical expertise.  
An Alternative to LT-WM: Modelling Expert Behaviour 
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At about the same time as the LT-WM paper appeared, two other theories of 
expertise were published, EPAM-IV (Richman et al., 1995) and the template 
theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996b), which both take EPAM (Feigenbaum & 
Simon, 1984) as their theoretical framework. It is of considerable theoretical 
interest to compare LT-WM with these theories, as both deal with empirical 
phenomena that Ericsson and Kintsch discuss at length (digit-span case for 
EPAM-IV, and chess for the template theory) and both use the idea of retrieval 
structure.  In addition, these theories are implemented as formal computer 
programs, which may be contrasted with Ericsson and Kintsch’s informal 
theory.7  
A Simulation of the Digit-Span Task Using EPAM-IV 
Inspired by the insights and analyses of Chase and Ericsson (1992), Ericsson 
and Staszewski (1989) and Staszewski (1990), Richman, Staszewski and 
Simon (1995) have recently shown that the idea of retrieval structure, 
combined with the EPAM theory of perception and memory, offers a 
sufficient explanation of SF and DD’s extraordinary performances in the digit-
span task.  Expanding and modifying earlier versions of EPAM (e.g., 
Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984), Richman et al.  have developed a computer 
model that simulates DD’s behaviour accurately, both at an aggregate and at a 
detailed level, and both qualitatively and quantitatively.  The model has three 
main components: an STM, an LTM, and a discrimination net, which allows 
nodes in LTM to be accessed.  Short-term memory includes specialised 
auditory and visual subcomponents, with iconic memories for each.  LTM 
includes a semantic and a procedural component.  Retrieval structures—which 
are specifically considered as deliberately acquired (p.  306)—are considered 
as schemas in semantic LTM.  Richman et al. describe various cognitive 
  26 
mechanisms in great detail, including mechanisms for learning chunks, for 
constructing retrieval structures, for building connections between slots of the 
retrieval structure and information held in semantic LTM, and for 
associatively searching semantic LTM.  They also explicitly make clear what 
aspects of the theory belong to a fixed architecture, and what aspects can be 
changed by learning or by deliberate strategies.  Finally, time parameters are 
associated with all processes.  For example, it takes 10 ms to traverse one 
node of the discrimination net, and it takes 200 ms to attach information to the 
retrieval structure. 
 Richman et al.’s theory shares several features with Ericsson and 
Kintsch’s (1995) account.  Most of these features relate to the role of LTM 
knowledge, acquired through practice and deliberate study, in the 
extraordinary performance of some experts in the digit-span task.  This 
knowledge includes retrieval structures, semantic categories (e.g., ages, 
running times), and numerical pattern codes (e.g., symmetry like 36-63).  
Their theory differs however in several ways from Ericsson and Kintsch’s.  In 
EPAM: (a) the retrieval structure contains slots, where values can be rapidly 
stored; (b) individual digits can be stored at the terminal nodes of the retrieval 
structure, and groups of digits at higher levels; (c) the retrieval structure is a 
schema in semantic memory; (d) approximate time parameters are given for 
each cognitive process, and decay parameters are estimated; and (e) times for 
basic cognitive processes are assumed to be invariant across skill levels.  By 
contrast, in the LT-WM account: (a) a mechanism based on retrieval cues is 
used to explain how the retrieval structure permits a rapid encoding; (b) only 
groups of digits can be stored in the retrieval structure; (c) the retrieval 
structure offers encoding mechanisms different from those offered by 
  27 
schemas; (d) no time or decay parameters are given; and (e) a speed-up in 
basic cognitive processes, such as encoding and retrieval, is postulated.  
Finally, the computer implementation of the EPAM theory allows one to 
explore complex interactions between various processes, which is not possible 
in the LT-WM approach.  In general, Richman et al.  show that a detailed 
theory of cognitive processes can be implemented as a computer program, 
which allows for a high level of precision and makes it possible to rigorously 
test the fit of the theory to the data.  In spite of these differences, it is fair to 
say that Ericsson and Kintsch (1995), extending Chase and Ericsson (1982) 
skilled memory theory, have given an account of expertise in the digit-span 
task that qualitatively captures the main empirical phenomena.   
Retrieval Structures and Templates: The Case of Chess Expertise 
As discussed above, the empirical data on chess skilled memory only weakly 
support the hypothesis of a 64-square hierarchical retrieval structure and even 
contradict some of the predictions of the LT-WM theory, mainly because the 
proposed mechanisms (retrieval structure and rapid generation of LTM 
structures) are too powerful.  In addition, the lack of specificity of LT-WM 
account of chess expertise makes it difficult to evaluate.  Since Ericsson and 
Kintsch (1995) claim that data from chess research provide some of the most 
compelling evidence for LT-WM, this implies serious limitations in the 
generality of their theory.  Although the interference and multiple board 
experiments suggest that the general message of Ericsson and Kintsch—LTM 
encoding is faster than was supposed in earlier theories—is valid, it appears 
that chess masters use mechanisms different from that postulated by Ericsson 
and Kintsch (1995). 
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 Why does the LT-WM theory, which convincingly explains 
mnemonists’ behaviour, have so many difficulties with data from expert chess 
memory? It is not because chess is an idiosyncratic task removed from normal 
human cognition: the main features of chess expertise (selective search, 
memory for meaningful material in the domain of expertise, importance of 
pattern recognition) are generalizable to quite a few other domains (Charness, 
1992).  Rather, these difficulties seem to come from inappropriately 
generalising theoretical constructs that are specific to domains where explicit 
mnemonic strategies play an important role.  More specifically, the LT-WM 
approach postulates for many domains what I will call a generic retrieval 
structure (cf.  Figure 4 of Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), that is a structure that 
does not depend on the specifics of the material presented (assuming that this 
material belongs to the domain of expertise); while this structure allows better 
storage when the input can be coded as high-level representations such as 
schemas, it can also be used when the material is less well structured or not 
structured at all.  A key feature of a generic retrieval structure is therefore that 
it can be used even with random material.  Moreover, in at least some task 
domains, such as mental abacus calculation, this structure permits information 
to be encoded through retrieval cues even in the absence of the second 
encoding mechanism provided by the LT-WM theory—integration through 
schemas already stored in LTM.   
 A comparison of the LT-WM theory and the template theory (Gobet & 
Simon, 1996b; 1998; in press) will clarify what are the main theoretical 
weaknesses, in semantically rich domains, of the type of general-purpose 
retrieval structures proposed by Ericsson and Kintsch.  The template theory, 
which is implemented as a computer program, is a revision of the chunking 
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theory (Chase & Simon, 1973) and, like Richman et al.’s (1995) model, it uses 
the EPAM architecture, including its time parameters (there are some minor 
differences that need not concern us here).  It proposes that expertise is due to: 
(a) a large database of chunks, indexed by a discrimination net; (b) a large 
semantic memory, including both schemas and productions; and (c) 
associations between the (perceptual) chunks and the semantic memory, as 
well as associations within semantic memory.  In addition, the theory proposes 
that some chunks that recur often during practice and study evolve into more 
complex data structures (templates), which allow information to be rapidly 
encoded into slots.  For example, in a given class of chess positions, a slot 
may be created for a square that plays an important role and that can be 
occupied by different types of pieces or be empty at different times.  
Templates offer both core information that cannot be changed (as with the 
chunks of the chunking theory) and slots allowing rapid updating of 
information.  The theory proposes that different templates will be retrieved for 
different classes of positions and that, because of their construction based on 
the recurrence of certain patterns of pieces, templates are unlikely to be 
recognised in random positions.  Finally, the template theory assumes that 
visual STM is limited to about three items (cf.  Zhang & Simon, 1985).  The 
template theory accounts for most empirical data from chess memory research 
(Gobet, 1998a), and is also compatible with data on problem solving (Gobet, 
1997). 
 While the template theory has much in common with the LT-WM 
theory, in particular the assumption that experts are able to encode material 
into LTM rapidly and that this ability is limited to their domain of expertise, 
there are two basic differences in their use of retrieval structures, one related 
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to the retrieval availability, the other to the specificity of encoding: (a) 
Templates are specific to a class of stimuli and can be used only in cases 
where they have been accessed through perceptual cues, while the retrieval 
structure proposed by Ericsson and Kintsch for chess is generic; and (b) 
Template slots are created only for certain aspects of the stimuli (in chess, 
certain squares or pieces, depending on the class of positions), while the LT-
WM theory assumes that the retrieval cues of the retrieval structures apply 
equally to all stimuli (the 64 “squares” of the chess retrieval structure are 
usable for any type of position, as well as the other (unspecified) levels of the 
hierarchical retrieval structure).  These two differences explain why one theory 
accounts successfully for most of the results reviewed here, and why the other 
fails.  In particular, three sets of results follow directly from the template 
theory: first, the necessity of accessing chunks and templates in LTM through 
recognition explains that recall is more difficult with random positions and 
positions presented with non-natural groupings of pieces; second, rapid access 
by recognition through the discrimination net accounts for the high 
performance with short presentation times; and third, strong players can recall 
several boards presented rapidly because they can use one template per 
position if the positions are typical enough; the limit of visual STM and the 
slow LTM storage time (about 8 s to create a chunk) impose a limit of about 4 
items, which accounts for masters’ difficulty in remembering more than four 
boards.  (As mentioned above, the second interpretation of LT-WM accounts 
for the first sets of results as well.  However, all the explanatory power is 
given by recognition of chunks—patterns or schemas—and not by the use of a 
retrieval structure or elaboration of LTM structures). 
Types of Retrieval Structures 
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What Ericsson and Kintsch refer to as retrieval structures consist of (at least) 
three different sets of entities.  First, there are the generic retrieval structures 
used in the digit-span task, the restaurant menu task, and, for that matter, in 
most mnemonics such as the method of loci.  In these tasks, experts use 
arbitrary structures, developed with the deliberate goal of improving their 
memory (cf. the modelling of the digit-span task by Richman et al., 1995).  
Tasks like mental abacus calculation and mental calculation may also fit into 
this category, with the qualification that the retrieval structures are not 
arbitrary but are shaped by the demands of the tasks (e.g., the necessity of 
computing intermediate products) and with the complication that encoding 
into LTM does not seem to allow as good retrieval as in the previous tasks (cf.  
the moderate to poor incidental recall), perhaps because there is a deliberate 
intention to encode cues that are useful only for a limited amount of time.  
Finally, as argued above, chess experts’ retrieval structures were incorrectly 
identified by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) as being generic.   
 Second, there is the episodic text structure, which is built up rapidly 
with the comprehension of a text, but which becomes more rapidly 
inaccessible than the first type of structures.  Third, domain knowledge—that 
is, patterns and schemas—is also taken to provide retrieval structures in text 
comprehension.  These three types of retrieval structures have clearly different 
properties (stability, relation with schemas, generality of use), and it is 
unfortunate that Ericsson and Kintsch have conflated them into a single 
construct. 
 Templates, which may be construed as specific, schematic retrieval 
structures within the Ericsson and Kintsch framework, can be used only when 
cues in the environment signal their appropriateness, and their usefulness 
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cannot be anticipated beforehand.  Tasks like chess, medical diagnosis, and to 
some extent text comprehension seem to fit into this category.  The difference 
between generic and specific retrieval structures is by no means trivial: within 
the template theory, specific retrieval structures are included in LTM schemas, 
while Ericsson and Kintsch make it clear that their generic retrieval structures 
are distinct from, although interconnected with, LTM schemas (e.g., their 
Figure 4, and the discussion surrounding it).  (See also Gobet & Simon, 
1996b, p. 36-38, and Richman et al., 1995, p. 306, for a comparison of generic 
and specific retrieval structures.) 
Conclusion 
The concept of retrieval structure, in the strict sense of a generic structure, 
does offer a theoretically plausible explanation in domains where memory for 
order is important, where there is a conscious effort to both construct and use 
a memory structure under strategic control, and where the input is encoded 
serially.  It does not fit with the empirical data in the domain of chess and 
medical expertise, where specific structures seem to be used.  Establishing 
what categories of experts use such generic retrieval structures is an empirical 
question, although a cursory examination of the task environments in which 
experts operate indicate that information is often not encoded into an abstract, 
generic structure but is integrated into semantic networks already present in 
LTM.  While Ericsson and Kintsch do consider the latter type of encoding, 
they also give an unduly important role to generic retrieval structures. 
 In summary, the empirical support for the LT-WM theory is much 
weaker than proposed by Ericsson and Kintsch.  With some data (in particular 
in chess and medical expertise), the predictions of the theory are directly 
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refuted.  With others, the theory is too vague to generate predictions without 
numerous auxiliary assumptions.  Finally, the theory is not internally 
consistent, the key concept of retrieval structure referring to entities having 
different psychological properties.  Ericsson and Kintsch’s review of empirical 
results from the literature on expertise and text comprehension represents a 
welcome challenge to theories of working memory, and this is an important 
contribution of their paper.  However, the LT-WM theory—their own 
response to this challenge—fails, because the evidence provided for LT-WM 
mechanisms and structures is rather weak.   
 Implicit in my discussion of LT-WM is the assumption that 
psychological theories should be stated precisely and unambiguously, if 
possible as mathematical or computational models.  While Ericsson and 
Kintsch mention in their conclusion (1995, p. 240) the need of implementing 
LT-WM as a processing model, they also think that an informal account can 
be given that makes testable predictions.  In this respect, my position is less 
optimistic: given the complexity and the number of mechanisms involved in a 
theory such as LT-WM—encodings into retrieval structures, elaborative 
encodings, strategies, proactive and retroactive interference, amount of expert 
knowledge used, interaction with the task demands—I believe it hopeless to 
try to derive predictions and explanations without a process model 
implemented as a computer program.  Note that LT-WM is in a better 
situation with text comprehension, where subsets of the theory have been 
implemented as computer programs (see Kintsch, 1998). 
 This bring us to an important methodological question: How to 
compare informal theories covering a large number of domains with little 
precision with formal theories covering a small number of domains with high 
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precision?  There are at least three reasons, in addition to those mentioned 
above, why formal, quantitative theories should be preferred: (a) their fit to 
empirical data can be estimated, which may indicate places where the theory 
can be improved; (b) their use of quantitative parameters allow quantitative 
predictions, which are always stronger than qualitative predictions; and (c) 
their formal structure makes it harder to use ad hoc assumptions, which in turn 
keeps the number of degrees of freedom of the theory under control. (For a 
detailed discussion of these points, see Grant, 1962; Gregg & Simon, 1967; 
Meehl, 1967; and Popper, 1959). 
 As a conceptual framework, loosely combining mechanisms and 
structures, but summarising a large body of empirical data and hinting at 
where future research should be carried out, there is little to criticise in LT-
WM.  But, as a theory—and by comparing LT-WM to other current theories of 
memory, Ericsson and Kintsch invite us to consider it as such—LT-WM is 
disappointing in its current state: key concepts are not defined, many 
mechanisms, structures and parameters are left unspecified, and several 
empirical findings are at variance with the theory.  Now, it is true that 
Ericsson and Kintsch’s paper presents the first version of their theory and that 
several of these weaknesses will hopefully be removed in future elaborations.  
My expectation is that, as the theory is modified and improved, the need for a 
formal, information-processing implementation will become more apparent. 
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Footnotes 
 
 
 
1Basic storage and retrieval operations seem to vary as a function of expertise in the 
LT-WM theory.  However, without an indication of at least the order of magnitude of 
time and decay parameters and of their rate of change with expertise, it is impossible 
to derive any quantitative prediction from the theory. 
2
 This assumes a serial encoding within the retrieval structure.  This seems in 
agreement with Ericsson and Kintsch, who state that experts use retrieval structures 
similar to those of SF and do not make any mention of parallel encoding. 
3
 One has only to assume that it takes about 8 s to create a new chunk (Newell & 
Simon, 1972), that it takes about 2 s to add information to a chunk (Simon, 1976), 
and that the last chunks (containing possibly only one piece) attended to are stored in 
STM at the end of the presentation.  This explanation works both for visual and 
auditory presentation (see Gobet, 1998, and Gobet & Simon, in press, for computer 
simulations of experiments with visual presentation).  Thus, contrary to Ericsson and 
Kintsch’s  (1995, p. 237) claims, theories of chess skill based on visual recognition of 
chunks can account for experiments where the pieces are dictated one at a time. 
4
 Cf.  Delaney and Ericsson (1998, p. 109): “The maintenance of encoded relations 
between pieces and locations in a random position therefore appear to depend 
critically on the retrieval structure, which can only uniquely index a single chessboard 
arrangement at a time.” 
5
 Actually, it should be easier to encode them into new distinct structures in LTM, 
because random positions differ radically from the positions learnt by chess players 
through experience and, therefore, should suffer less mutual interference. 
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6
 As noted by an anonymous reviewer, age is confounded with expertise in almost 
every medical expertise study.  Given that memory in recall tasks is age sensitive, this 
confound makes the interpretation of these studies very difficult indeed. 
7
 The emphasis here is in comparing LT-WM with these two theories.  For a detailed 
account of EPAM-IV, including the differences with previous versions of EPAM and 
a discussion of the simulations, the reader is referred to Richman et al. (1995).  Earlier 
versions of CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy and REtrieval STructure), the computer 
implementation of the template theory, are discussed in Gobet (1993) and in De Groot 
& Gobet (1996); the current version is discussed in Gobet (1998) and in Gobet and 
Simon (in press).   
